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Front-Line Practitioners versus Received Theories of 
Crime and Terrorism 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides an analytical summary of the findings of a research project 
into the activities, the causes of, and responses to, organized crime and 
terrorism. Based on the views of front-line practitioners such as social workers, 
teachers, law enforcers and other experts, the paper examines their needs, 
interpretations, uncertainties and perspectives. It then compares these views 
with those emerging from previous analyses and research, highlighting the 
assonances and dissonances that typically crowd these areas of investigation. 
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Introduction 
Practitioners dealing with organized crime and terrorist networks develop views 
around the activities and causes leading individuals to join such networks. They 
also evaluate the effectiveness of responses to these phenomena and, in a 
reflective fashion, the adequacy of the professional setting in which they operate. 
Causation aspects have been addressed by many criminological schools of 
thought, including positivism, functionalism, labeling, strain, conflict and control 
theory. These theories attempt to identify the drivers of both phenomena while 
hypothesizing the pathways of offenders into organized criminality and terror 
activities. The practitioners who acted as informants in this research drew on 
their own direct experience in dealing with both, highlighting the constraints, 
difficulties and misunderstandings hampering their routine work, but they also 
expressed views that find an echo in the criminological literature. As responses 
to organized crime and terrorism are inevitably linked to their perceived causes, 
informants in this research project also expressed views on the efficacy of 
existing legislation and the structural makeup of the organizations in which they 
worked. This paper examines such views in light of analyses and previous 
research conducted into organized crime and terrorism.  
   Due to its exploratory character, this research did not set off with precise initial 
hypotheses, rather it was designed with the awareness that views of organized 
crime and terrorism vary according to the social and professional position one 
occupies. Variations of views pertain to the causes of the phenomena observed, 
the range of harmful activities enacted, and the efficacy of preventive and 
repressive responses. The purpose of the research, therefore, was to draw a 
picture of how the views and operations of the different cohorts of informants 
were affected by the specific context in which they were positioned. Of particular 
interest for the research was to determine to what extent the views of criminal 
justice professionals and non-professionals differed, but also those of academic 
researchers and law enforcers.  
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Methodology 
Using a mixed methodology that includes a quantitative empirical framework 
with qualitative inputs from interviews, focus groups and workshops, this 
research canvassed the views of key commentators in the field. The respondents 
were selected from law enforcement agencies, policy makers, the academic 
community, practitioners and other stakeholders in the area of prevention of 
organized crime and terrorism. A quantitative survey was conducted to engage 
front-line practitioners and professionals. Focus groups were then carried out 
with practitioner organizations working as law enforcement agents. Finally, 
workshops were conducted with solution providers, professionals and experts in 
the field of security.  
   All the different components of the research focused on the same topics, 
namely the causes, activities and responses to organised crime and terrorism. 
The findings were studied and evaluated in research consortium meetings and 
are interspersed in the narrative below, where the convergence with, and 
divergence from, findings produced by previous research are also noted. 
   In more detail, interviews were held with informants based in the following 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Italy, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK. On the institutional 
EU-level, 6 interviews with relevant experts were carried out. Few more 
interviews (3) were conducted with researchers established in the surveyed 
countries but whose expertise was not country focussed. They were experts on 
terrorism and organised crime in Europe in general. Among the interviewees, 
researchers constituted the highest number of responders (53 interviews, 47.3 
%), followed by practitioners (24 interviews, 21.4 %), and policy-makers (13 
interviews, 11.6 %). These latter served at the national level (members of 
national parliaments), while few of them operated at the local or international 
level. Responders labelled as practitioners often decided to hide their affiliation 
and name. Those who stated their affiliation had a variety of tasks: the sample 
included police officers, people working for NGOs, working in prisons, working 
on counter-terrorism or organised crime within administrations, as well as social 
workers working on prevention. Some responders were categorized with mixed-
connotation labels (22 interviews, 19.6 %): these responders were experts in 
multiple fields of activities, thereby allowing interviewers to gain interesting 
insights into multifaceted perspectives on issues related to organised crime  
and/or terrorist networks.  
 
An online survey gathered data on the practices and views of first-line 
professionals, who were directly or indirectly helping to address the causes or 
effects associated with terrorism and/or organised crime. Data collection for the 
survey took place from May 24 to September 16, 2017 by using the Qualtrics 
Online Survey tool. This survey targeted a niche pool of respondents rather than 
the general population, which explains the sample size of 519. Regarding the 
demographics, more than 65% of the respondents were male and a majority was 
between 30 to 40 years old. The survey covered a total of 23 countries, 15  
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different professions that fall into the category of first-line-practitioners and 12 
different areas of work within these professions. The findings were generated 
via the use of SPSS software. 
   Eleven focus groups were organized in 8 countries across the European Union. 
The focus groups engaged 107 law enforcement agents and front line 
practitioner organizations working on organized crime or terrorist networks. 
Finally, workshops were organized with solution providers, professionals and 
experts in the field of security.  
Focus groups were organised by individual partners involved in the project, who 
collectively agreed on the topics to be addressed. These included the use of cyber 
security tools, the investigation and prosecution of cyber crime, the impact of 
illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism in the prison environment, 
agency cooperation, prevention and community action. 
The workshops took place in Darmstadt, Reggio Calabria, Barcelona and 
Brussels, involving some forty professionals. Each workshop aimed to highlight 
current challenges, available solutions as well as possible societal and ethical 
issues.  
Workshops involved a total of 31 experts, contacted through public or private 
organisations. Participants in the workshops were researchers, advisors or 
solution providers in the areas of organised crime and terrorism. Among the 
topics addressed were, first, technical perspectives, with participants assessing 
the efficacy of their solutions; second, users’ perspectives, with law enforcers 
evaluating the limitations of the tools at their disposal; and third, research 
perspectives, where researchers identified lacunae in their work and indicated 
potential directions for future investigations. 
Findings 
Organized crime activities 
There was a sense that knowledge of the organized crime and terrorist 
phenomena is insufficient. This lack of knowledge was highlighted in the survey 
as well as in the qualitative research based on workshops, focus groups and 
interviews. Among the experts interviewed the point was made that more 
cooperation between researchers and practitioners, along with less emotional 
attitudes on the part of public bodies, would contribute to a better 
understanding of both phenomena. Those interviewed also stressed the 
importance of collaborating with external experts, particularly in the relatively 
‘unknown’ area of cybercrime. Interviews, moreover, brought to the fore the 
need for an international platform for the exchange of information. The majority 
of respondents (60%), however, mentioned drug production/distribution and 
cybercrime, along with the smuggling of people, as the main activities of 
organized crime. In their view, these require more effective prevention or 
response policies and strategies. Only in a minority of national contexts was it 
felt that the activities of organized crime include forays into the licit world 
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thanks to the partnership with, and the support or tolerance of, official political 
representatives and/or legitimate entrepreneurs. 
   Two main points need to be highlighted here. First, the research process led to 
no distinction being made between professional and organized crime. The 
former is characterized by a horizontal structure in which agents operate as 
peers, planning schemes together, executing them, and sharing proceeds. By 
contrast, the latter implies a distinction between planning and execution, a wage 
relationship between a patron and an agent, and a degree of invisibility: agents 
may ignore the motivations and the very identity of those recruiting them 
(Arlacchi, 1994; Armao, 2000; Ruggiero, 2000; Dino, 2008). The activities 
mentioned by our informants, to be sure, may be carried out by both 
professional and organized criminals, but the emphasis was only posed on the 
latter. Second, the activities conducted by organized crime in the official arena, 
which concerned only few of the experts interviewed, were neglected by the 
majority of informants contacted through the quantitative as well as the 
qualitative research. 
   Previous research proved that organized criminal groups who gain access to 
the legitimate economy and the political apparatus complete the evolution 
hypothesized by Peterson (1991), whereby this type of crime traverses a 
number of successive stages: a predatory, a parasitic, and finally a symbiotic 
stage. While some groups may fail to undergo a similar evolution, thus stagnating 
in conventional criminal markets, others may instead succeed, therefore 
straddling legality and illegality.  
   By focusing on conventional criminal activities, many of our respondents 
overlooked the instances in which organized crime invests into the official 
economy, engages in the delivery of services and in the formation of 
partnerships with legitimate actors. Criminal networks, which facilitate such 
non-conventional activities, were also neglected (Dino and Ruggiero, 2012; 
Ruggiero, 2017). 
In brief, informants focused their attention mainly on conventional criminal 
activities, namely organized groups that remain confined to illicit markets. 
Organized crime drivers 
‘Being raised in a criminal environment’ scored very high among our 
respondents (66%), whereas ‘Discriminatory police tactics against certain 
groups and individuals’ scored very low (7%). Families were regarded as part of 
such criminal environment. Some participants in the focus groups claimed that 
legal restrictions on police work was a problem for those involved in the 
investigation of human smuggling, a problem also encountered in the 
identification of criminals due to data protection laws. The analysis of our 
quantitative data also shows that joining organized crime networks was 
perceived less to do with mental difficulties and instability than with lack of 
opportunities (45%). It is interesting to locate the responses received in our 
survey within the traditional and contemporary debate around the causes of 
organized crime.  
From the perspective of the Positivist School of criminology, the variable 
‘tradition’ plays a crucial role (Lombroso, 1971). ‘A criminal environment’, and 
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‘families’ within it, return in subsequent interpretations in the form of 
‘backwardness’ or ‘archaism’. These are analyses that address organized crime 
from a ‘cultural’ perspective (among the most celebrated are Hess, 1973 and 
Hobsbawm, 1971). Belonging to the same cluster are contributions focusing on 
the perpetuation of organized forms of criminality, which is said to derive from 
the lack of popular stigma attached to those involved. Subcultural theorists, for 
instance, would argue that members of criminal organizations are not regarded 
as individuals belonging to a distant and censurable social universe, nor are they 
associated with immorality or elicit contempt (Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 
1960). Our respondents, by emphasizing the ‘learning process’ implied in being 
‘raised in a criminal environment’, located their views in the tradition of 
subcultural theories. 
Echoing strain theory, the relative majority of participants in the online survey 
singled out ‘lack of opportunities’ as a causation variable. Merton's (1968) 
deviant adaptation of the ‘innovative’ type comes to mind, namely a solution 
adopted by those who pursue the official goals of money and success through 
alternative illicit means. The quantitative parts of the research, on the other 
hand, failed to provide the nuanced descriptions found in the ‘social 
disorganisation’ tradition, that is to say descriptions of organized crime as micro-
societies characterised by a surrogate social order (Downes and Rock, 1988; 
Thrasher, 1927; Shaw, 1930; Whyte, 1943; Landesco, 1969). While police 
discrimination against certain individuals and groups was deemed irrelevant by 
our respondents, some classical literature, instead, focuses on the participation 
of the police themselves in organised criminality (Landesco, 1969). Finally, the 
variable ‘low self-control’ (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990) did emerge in 
interviews and workshops, but notions of organised crime as service provider in 
contexts characterised by lack of trust were not (McIntosh, 1975; Gambetta, 
1992; Varese, 2010; 2017).  
Measures against organized crime 
Respondents mainly opted for the creation of special police/law enforcement 
units (49%) and discarded the idea that new drug legislation would have an 
effect on the fight against organized crime (22%). Little attention was devoted to 
the potential of labour market reform and improved welfare provision (20%). 
The analysis of our quantitative data reveals that the policing and criminal 
justice group of our informants did not necessarily see harder tactics as effective 
prevention tools. Participants in focus groups stressed the importance of 
integrating young people and empowering them, namely making them able to 
express their opinions and reach independent decisions.  More involvement of 
civil society was advocated, along with more material resources and training for 
law enforcers and investigators. Interviews with experts revealed unsatisfactory 
feelings around the problem of agency cooperation and transnational 
coordination of responses. They also emphasized how institutional responses 
are often driven by emergency situations and determined by the search for 
political consensus. Some interviewees stressed the importance, in the fight 
against organized crime, of establishing proper protection for whistleblowers. 
The analysis of quantitative data shows a prevalence of non-criminal justice 
professionals favouring human and social approaches to reduce the incidence of 
organized crime (44%). The analysis also reveals that aims and objectives in 
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combatting this type of crime are shared across occupational roles. Some law 
enforcers involved in focus groups lamented the inadequacy of cybercrime units 
and the need to liaise with the private sector, particularly commercial banks. 
Respondents involved in workshops stressed the need for strong coordination, 
communication and alignment of national and international laws that regulate 
the field of cyber-security. Interviewees pointed out the need for more strategic, 
comprehensive, prevention measures, but also for techniques able to evaluate 
the effectiveness of such measures.  
For further analysis and as mentioned in the introduction, data was manipulated 
to collapse those participants working in criminal justice related fields (CJ 
professionals) and those working in other domains such as education and youth 
work (non-CJ professionals). Comparing criminal justice professionals to non-
criminal justice professionals, we see a difference as to how they believe 









Social welfare 28 (63) 40 (36) 4.08* 
Job creation 48 (61) 53 (87) 0.81, NS 
Increased 
policing 
28 (33) 31 (47) 0.33, NS 
Sentence 
enhancement 
34 (41) 38 (60) 0.60, NS 
Increased 
therapy 
24 (30) 35 (55) 4.0* 
Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.05 level. The analysis illustrates those participants who 
responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect. The figures in parentheses indicate 
numbers of informants. 
Table 1: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions for crime reduction across professional types 
Two findings are worth attention. Firstly, in percentage, respondents within both 
groups did not differ substantially in how they saw job creation as a preventative 
measure. On the other hand, the relatively low score of ‘increased policing’ and 
‘sentence enhancement’ may indicate that, perhaps inadvertently, informants 
applied an economic logic to prevention and prosecution, echoing classical 
studies such as Becker’s on the optimal enforcement expenditure. This, in Becker 
(1968; 1976), is to be understood as the ideal amount of enforcement, which 
depends, among other things, on the cost of detection, apprehension, criminal 
conviction and punishment of offenders. Such cost should not exceed that 
incurred by society as a consequence of criminal activity. 
   Surprisingly, the policing and criminal justice group did not necessarily see 
harder tactics working in prevention and reduction. Interestingly, more human-
centred approaches such as social welfare intervention, as well the enhancement 
of mental health and psychological services, did show a difference, with non-
criminal justice professionals favouring them. Table 3 below explores an 










33 (41) 38 (62) 0.77, NS 
Special units 51 (63) 49 (80) 0.17, NS 
Investments 
schools 
37 (46) 43 (67) 0.88, NS 
Legalise 
prostitution 
18 (19) 18 (24) 0.02, NS 
Legalise drugs 20 (31) 27 (36) 0.24, NS 
Community 
policing 
40 (50) 42 (67) 0.05, NS 
Note: The analysis illustrates those participates who responded to the question as either having a moderate or 
strong effect. 
Table 2: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across reducing organized criminality 
Table 2 above shows that there was no difference between the opinions of 
individuals within each professional category regarding the effects of each action 
aimed at curbing/reducing organized criminality. The percentages of each 
subsample, with the exception of the ‘creation of special policing units’, were all 
of moderate level, meaning that the majority of all participants, regardless of 
what they believed to be appropriate in tackling organized crime, thought that 
these factors will only partly influence crime reduction. A positive message to 
take away from this analysis is, again, the similar views of participants 
regardless of their social or professional role.  
   But let us provide a general backdrop against which the responses received 
might be better understood. 
Backdrop 
Informants, in sum, advocated a mixture of measures connoted by both a social 
and a technical character. Educational programmes aimed at spreading civic 
awareness were prioritized, as were projects promoting social inclusion. In line 
with anti-drug policies already operational across Europe, the majority of 
respondents called for tackling demand through informative public health 
campaigns and supply through international agency cooperation. Skepticism 
about the introduction of new legislation led to neglecting the potential effect of 
decriminalizing the use of some drugs. As already mentioned, little interest was 
also shown in social prevention based around labour market reform and 
improved welfare provision.  By contrast, research conducted by institutional 
agencies (Europol, 2011) and independent investigators alike (Hobbs, 2013; 
Dino, 2016) depicts organized crime as ‘employer’ attracting individuals who 
find no suitable occupation in the official labour market. With legitimate 
occupations being increasingly characterized by precarious conditions and poor 
wages, organized crime may well appear as a more appealing labour recruiter. 
Social prevention, in this respect, should make legitimate work competitive, in 
ethical and material terms, with illicit activity.  
Prioritizing, as most informants did, the use of special tools and units appears to 
be consistent with the common strategies already used by European 
governments, which consist of ‘dismantling criminal organizations by 
dismantling their leadership structures in order to fragment them into minor 
and more manageable groups’ (Ferreira, 2016: 43). Measures have included a 
mixture of undercover operations, raids, privacy-piercing approaches, and, 
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increasingly, collaboration with intelligence services and international policing 
agencies. Some observers would judge such strategies ineffective, particularly in 
developed countries, while in developing countries they risk, it is feared, to 
‘intensify pre-existing conflicts, turf wars, and generate smaller, less predictable 
and more violent groups fighting fiercely for smaller turfs’ (ibid: 43). In brief, the 
old dilemma whether monopolistic organized crime causes more harm than 
disorganized crime remains unsolved (Andreano and Siegfried, 1980). For this 
reason, some academic researchers would suggest that efforts to eradicate 
organized crime should rely less on conventional crime-control activities than on 
the alteration of the incentive structures in place in the economic and the 
political sphere (Milhaupt and West, 2000). Hence the broad structural 
suggestions emanating from the European Parliament (2016): increasing public 
finding for schemes in underdeveloped regions, implementing economic growth 
strategies, enforcing and strengthening the regulations governing national and 
international financial institutions, prosecuting money-laundering enablers, 
developing international schemes of asset recovery, and harmonizing standards 
for confiscation.  
   It has to be noted, that while informants in this research also stressed the 
importance of patrimonial measures, they failed to appreciate the role that the 
allocation of funds to problematic regions could play. In fact, they called for more 
funds, resources and training to be allocated to law enforcers rather than to 
society at large.  
As mentioned above, informants were perplexed about the way in which the 
effectiveness of strategies and measures can be assessed. Their perplexity may 
derive from the fact that strategies and measures mainly target closed enclaves 
of socially and culturally homogenous individuals, in other words they confine 
their intervention to conventional criminal activities, or the underworld, while 
overlooking the connections this establishes with the overworld. As already 
noted, only in reference to specific national contexts (for instance, Bulgaria), was 
the unwillingness of government to sever the links between organized crime and 
the official world pointed out. 
It is difficult to explain the unsatisfactory feelings expressed by informants 
around the problem of agency cooperation and transnational coordination of 
responses. The Maastricht Treaty includes articles concerning police cooperation 
and addresses the growth of organized crime as a product of the process of 
integration. First regarded as an issue to be tackled under the Third Pillar (the 
intergovernmental pillar), the fight against organized crime gave rise to police 
and judicial cooperation and new systems and procedures to improve the 
sharing of information. In 1990, member states stipulated the Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, which 
was turned by the Council into a directive in 1991. Under the directive, states 
were forced to implement legislation against money laundering, ‘but also to 
ensure that their financial institutions would register and report unusual and 
suspect transactions to the competent authorities (Fijnaut, 2015: 574). 
Cooperation among member states stepped up in the aftermath of the 
assassination of Palermo investigative judges Falcone and Borsellino in 1992, 
and resulted in the establishment of Europol in 1995. European concerns around 
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organized crime were also intensified by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
threat of new forms of criminal activity emanating from its former satellite states 
in Eastern Europe (Dunn, 1996). An Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime was 
produced in 1997 under the banner of the Treaty of Amsterdam, instructing 
member states to integrate prevention, investigation and prosecution and 
harmonize their legislations. In a cumulative process, policies and strategies 
were devised under the successive presidencies of the European Council, and 
in1999 Eurojust was created, namely a multinational European team of national 
prosecutors and police officers. A European Police College was funded while a 
Financial Intelligence Unit tasked with information sharing about money 
laundering was set up (Fijnaut, 2015). In brief, the unsatisfactory feelings 
conveyed by informants may testify to the difficulties member states encounter 
when they attempt to translate general principles and guidelines (or even 
instructions) into routine practical action. Or, as they argued, may derive from 
their perception that institutional responses are often driven by emergency 
situations and determined by the search for political consensus.  
As for the technical measures advocated, increasing the quality of equipment and 
training of police forces scored high (about 40%). Support was given to the 
European Parliament suggestions to strengthen the regulations governing the 
activities of financial institutions and the prosecution of money-laundering 
enablers (see Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 3). But along with the importance of patrimonial measures, the crucial 
role of special units for the fight of organized crime seemed to be prioritized.  
Terrorist networks 
Activities 
In general terms, also in the area of terrorism more cooperation between 
researchers and practitioners was deemed necessary for a better understanding 
of the phenomenon. The highest number and proportion of respondents stressed 
that propaganda and recruitment require more effective prevention (12%). In 
the focus groups, however, it was argued that common definitions of violent 
extremism, radicalization and terrorism are needed, and that the emotional 
public reaction to such phenomena hampers their understanding. The analysis of 
our data shows a generalized concern among respondents about terrorism 
financing and cyber terrorism (10%). Some interviewees lamented that 
expertise in this area is underused by official agencies.  One important finding 
was that the invasion of countries was not deemed to stop terrorism, but rather 
encourage it. It is interesting to compare this concern with research findings on 
this specific issue and other aspects of terrorism. 
Working closely with Islamic fundamentalists, Sageman (2017) gained an 
intimate understanding of how propaganda and recruitment take place. He 
observed the development of networks transforming socially isolated individuals 
into warriors, and noted that affiliation is normally a bottom-up process, with 
young people volunteering to join the organization. Friendship and kinship 
bonds emerged as key factors in shaping the networks. In brief, propaganda and 
recruitment, the concerns of our informants, occur through micro-social 
dynamics which are little known to law enforcement and, therefore, can hardly 
be influenced by outsiders.  
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The necessity to clarify definitions is perceived in the existing literature as it was 
by the majority of our respondents. However, the emotional public reaction to 
terrorism, regarded by respondents as detrimental, seems to be perfectly 
understandable when targeting preferences are examined. Research conducted 
on this aspect reveals that soft targets are ‘dominant and increasing, while 
particularly well-protected targets are almost totally avoided’ (Hemmingby, 
2017: 25). In other words, the general public is more exposed than high-ranking 
individuals or highly symbolic buildings or premises such as parliaments, 
governmental institutions or business headquarters.  
The point was made by the relative majority of informants (12%) that the 
invasion of a country may be followed by organized violent resistance, and that 
invasions may destabilize regimes and trigger sectarian attacks. The example of 
Libya was referred to (Ismael and Ismael, 2013), while research suggests that 
over thirty per cent of the founders of ISIS were former members of the Ba’athist 
secret services of Iraq, who enact a form of revenge, responding with 
indiscriminate attacks to the invasion of their country (Gerges, 2015; Lynch, 
2015).   
Terrorist drivers 
 
In the opinion of the majority of respondents (60%), individuals join terrorist 
networks because they are raised in a culture that promotes extreme ideological 
views. Psychological-personality disorders, in their view, have a moderate 
influence (42%). In the focus groups some participants underlined the exclusion 
of young people joining terrorist networks and their search for stability when 
joining them. The stress was also on vulnerability and lack of guidance and 
security on the part of families. A strong association between economic 
exclusion, isolation and alienation was found in our data analysis (53%), which 
also showed the respondents’ emphasis on the influence of leadership figures 
(52%). 
   Cultures promoting extreme ideological views have been studied by scholars 
who have attempted to find in sacred texts the cause of contemporary terrorism. 
(Kennedy, 2016; Small, 2016; Adonis, 2016). Challenging causations derived 
from foundational texts, other scholars have underlined how the Quran is replete 
with suggestions around dialogue, peace and the development of harmonious 
interfaith relationships (Horkuc, 2009; Wills, 2016). Finally, the argument has 
been made that not Islam, but religion in general has always played a role in war 
and terrorist violence, even in advanced secular countries (Buc, 2015; Sacks, 
2015; Hassner, 2016).  
Research into psychological factors has linked terrorism with collective 
animosity against injustice and power. The final step on a narrowing staircase 
(Moghaddam, 2005), the choice of terror is said to appeal individuals who 
believe they have no voice in society and who express a ‘significance quest’ 
(Victoroff and Kruglanski et al, 2009). One of the causes identified in the 
literature is the feeling of ‘weakness, irrelevance, marginalization and 
subordination experienced by Muslim people’, combined with the memory of the 
glorious past of a great transnational civilization (Toscano, 2016: 123). The 
‘reactionary utopia’ of the Caliphate is explained in these terms, namely as the 
result of frustration determined by the gap between expectations and 
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achievement. The frustration thesis seems to apply to both prevailing models of 
terrorism: ‘the fanatic who is outside any appeal to rationality, and the 
calculating actor who lacks any capacity for human empathy’ (McDonald, 2013: 
11).  
    On the other hand, research has also examined terrorism as a corollary of 
social exclusion: extremists are said to come from the poorest and rundown 
parts of cities, where youth are raised in large housing estates and where trouble 
flares up periodically. Accounts illustrate the fractured lives of young second-
generation migrants, their alienation, exclusion, family size, poverty and 
disrupted upbringings. Some traverse the pathways from home to care and from 
crime to prison, struggle within the education system, and display all the 
‘predictors of criminal behaviour’ (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 337). However, 
‘It is erroneous to presume that material deprivation works in a simple and/or 
straightforward manner in relation to the propensity to commit violence’ (ibid: 
338). To claim that inequality and social injustice are the main causes of 
terrorism neglects the fact that there is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed 
by the United Nations as the poorest, least developed, most unjust and unequal. 
As Sen (2015: 165) has argued,  
‘The simple thesis linking poverty with violence is empirically much too 
crude, both because the linkage of poverty and crime is far from 
universally observed, and because there are other social factors… Calcutta 
is not only one of the poorest cities in India – and indeed in the world – it 
so happens that it also has a very low crime rate’ (ibid: 165).  
In sum, our respondents overstressed social and structural factors as causes of 
terrorism, although they also highlighted the ‘search for stability’ that 
encourages young people to join terrorist networks. Their views on cultures 
promoting violence find controversial treatment in research, while findings in 
the psychological domain may suggest that more attention to this area of 
investigation should be devoted.  
Measures to decrease terrorism 
The majority of respondents thought that cross-border cooperation between 
police and intelligence agencies to facilitate monitoring, arrest and disruption 
would have the strongest effect (52%), and that military action abroad to target 
terrorist leaders and infrastructure has no effect. Pre-emptive intelligence was 
called for, mainly in interviews and workshops. Opinions collected in focus 
groups addressed the issue of legal documentation for young migrants who 
otherwise ‘get lost in the system’. New comers, it was stressed, should receive 
appropriate support and guidance. Social workers, it was noted, needed to be 
properly trained in order to ‘connect’ with young people at risk. Often, their lack 
of religiosity was regarded as an obstacle preventing such connection.  Other 
actors to be involved in the preventative process, it was remarked, include 
community leaders, religious leaders, victims and families. One problem raised 
during the course of interviews with experts was that preventative and other 
measures are commonly the result of mere public pressure. Preventative work 
should also take place in prison institutions, it was remarked. Interviews 
stressed, at the same time, that policy-making processes should be evidence-
based and that a wider involvement of Muslim communities is necessary.  
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   As in the previous section on organized crime, an analysis was undertaken to 
explore whether there were any significant differences between professional 
role and belief in specific preventative actions. Table 3 speaks to each of these, 














Equipment 42 (25) 48 (41) 0.61, NS 
Social welfare 21 (12) 43 (32) 6.48** 
Job creation 33 (19) 36 (29) 0.06, NS 
Increased 
policing 
33 (20) 35 (27) 0.50, NS 
Special police 53 (32) 49 (41) 0.21, NS 
Increased 
therapy 
34 (19) 33 (26) 0.02, NS 
Note: (**) denotes significant association at the p<0.01 level. The analysis illustrates those participants who 
responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect. 
Table 3. Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across professional types 
None of the statistical tests undertaken (exploring the difference in beliefs 
around the reduction of terrorist activities or participation) were significant, 
with the exception of ‘social welfare’ approaches. Here, non-CJ professionals 
were twice more likely to believe that such approaches could work. Do note, 
however, that regardless of this, most of subsamples were below a majority 
(with the exception of CJ professionals seeing a moderate to strong effect in the 
inclusion of special police or units). This may demonstrate reluctance in the 
existing methods to curb contemporary terrorism in Europe. Of note is also the 
fact that the non-CJ professionals saw significantly more than their CJ 
counterparts the importance of work by civil society and the third sector in 
dealing with violent extremism and terrorism.  
   Table 4 provides additional information on potential actions that participants 









62 (37) 53 (45) 1.09, NS 
Improving 
community  
32 (18) 33 (27) 0.03, NS 




37 (20) 51 (39) 2.60* 
Community 
policing 
47 (27) 43 (55) 0.21, NS 
Reform education 36 (20) 31 (26) 0.44, NS 
Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.05 level. The analysis illustrates those participants who 
responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect. 
Table 4. Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across professional types 
It should be noted that non-CJ professionals scored higher than their CJ 
professionals not only (as one would expect) in respect of community-focused 
measures, but only with regard to border control and cross-border cooperation. 
Note also their high preference for community policing.  
   Let us interrogate research and other sources on these points. 
Official agencies seem to share the view that cross-border coordination has a 
strong effect. In this respect, an Agenda on Security for the period 2015-2020 
was set out by the European Commission, detailing the concrete tools to be used 
in joint anti-terrorist work (European Commission, 2015). Technical anti-
terrorist preventative measures adopted within the EU include exchange of DNA 
data, which is also carried out in the fight against other forms of cross-border 
crime (Santos and Machado, 2016), along with the introduction of new counter-
terrorism legislation in most member states.  Glorification and incitement are 
now widely criminalized.   
As for military intervention, most available literature oscillates between 
suggestions to deal with terrorism through the rule of law and deprecation for 
unnecessary military action. While EU citizens overwhelming believe that 
institutional action against terrorism and radicalization is insufficient (European 
Parliament, 2016), states reacting with pure military force are said to imitate the 
illusions and delusions of those groups or individuals they are trying to combat 
(English, 2016). The dangers of what is termed a ‘forever war’ are highlighted: 
‘Say the word “war” and the rule of law often implodes’ (Rakoff, 2016: 80). This 
is the view, among others, of distinguished law experts, who find themselves in 
disagreement when the judiciary avoids to scrutinize anything ‘embarrassing’ 
from far-reaching surveillance to torture or the use of drones (Todorov, 2014; 
Fiss, 2016). Equal controversy surrounds the use of ‘disposition matrix’ or ‘kill 
lists’ that spell out who has to be hit by a long-distance unmanned missile 
(Hayden, 2016).  
In the UK, a study has examined the emotional impact of counter-terrorist 
strategies on Muslim communities, while several authors have focused on how 
such strategies increase fear and encourage suspicion and racism (Mythen and 
Walklate, 2006; Ahmed, 2015; Abbas and Awan, 2015). Finally, counter-terrorist 
wars have also been judged as serious obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian 
aid (Gill, 2016). It should be added that, when there is a disconnect between the 
depiction of terrorist threat as presented by official agencies and the perception 
of large sectors of the public, responses to terror attacks fail to gain the support 
they would need (Smith et al, 2016). The disconnect is likely to widen, at least in 
the UK, after the publication of the Chilcot Report, showing the disastrous 
outcome of the institutional deceit leading to the invasion of Iraq (Chilcot, 2016; 
Wheatcroft, 2016). 
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Informants did not specify the type of pre-emptive intelligence measures they 
advocated, nor did they seem to be aware of the considerable controversies 
surrounding them. For instance, some schemes have been located within the 
‘pre-crime’ strategies adopted in many western countries. These strategies are 
said to centre state action on sheer suspicion, whereby individuals and groups 
are targeted without a specific charge being formulated. Anticipating risk, in this 
sense, tends to integrate national security into criminal justice, to the detriment 
of civil and political rights (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). Anti-terrorism, from 
this perspective, is said to become a threat to democracy (Wolfendale, 2007; 
Zedner, 2000).  
 In the available literature, scant attention is devoted to the importance, as 
underlined in interviews, of the religiosity of social workers, whereas some 
research findings are available on issues around prevention of radicalization in 
prison and in the financial arena, where terrorist organizations find resources to 
support their propaganda, attacks and the reproduction of their own networks 
(Hamm, 2007; 2013).  
Examples of community involvement as proposed by informants are relatively 
common across Europe. For example, prevention is pursued through targeting 
families, both those affected by the radicalization of one or more of their 
members and those who feel the need to protect their offspring from the 
radicalization process. In the UK, FAST (Families Against Stress & Trauma) is one 
such initiative, engaged in making people aware of the risks of the Internet and 
their exposure to violent messages. Although more controversial, the ‘Prevent’ 
programme, launched in the UK in 2003 as one of the four elements of CONTEST, 
the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, is inspired by similar aims, 
mobilizing in particular teachers and lecturers in the detection of embryonic 
signs of radicalization.   
‘Agenfor Media’ is also engaged in preventing radical escalation, and produces 
videos and printed documents. These explain how to deal with vulnerable 
groups and individuals of Muslim faith from an Islamic perspective. The area of 
radicalization in prison is covered, while an informative social media channel is 
provided dealing with wars and insurgents in several regions. 
(http://www.agenformedia.com/dossier/preventing-radical-escalations). 
Community-led (or social media) initiatives also take the form of testimonies and 
life stories of individuals affected by radicalization aiming to reduce the appeal of 
terrorist organizations.  
The ‘Viennese Network Deradicalization and Prevention’ is active in the Austrian 
capital and operates in the field of education. The network elaborates and 
assesses policies and strategies, addresses social inequality and vulnerable 
groups, focusing, among other things, on gender and sexism. In Spain, ‘Women 
without Borders’ address mothers in the attempt to raise their awareness of 
extremist ideologies, aiming at the creation of a future without fear and violence. 
Finally, some research proves that certain forms of community policing can 
promote Muslims’ willingness to cooperate with investigators in terrorist 
prevention. While intrusive counterterrorism policies and practices alienate the 
communities being addressed, perceptions of police legitimacy and fair policing 
appear to have a strong bearing on Muslims’ behaviour. Cooperation with the 
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police, in such cases, takes place despite ‘the salience of identity within the 
current political discourse about terrorism and Islam’ (Madon, Murphy and 
Cherney, 2017: 1144). 
 Our respondents proposed measures that share some components with these 
initiatives. For instance, when advocating the legal documentation and 
identification of young migrants (lest they ‘get lost in the system’), support was 
given to control systems based on community forms of policing. These would 
encourage the willingness of ordinary people and groups to cooperate in the 
preventive process, favouring at the same time the provision of support and 
guidance to youth. Included in similar social initiatives, were actors such as 
social workers, community leaders, religious leaders, victims and families, 
namely all figures, professional or not, involved in the projects described above. 
Analyses of the unintended consequences of policy interventions and strategic 
tactics suggest that ‘sometimes these interventions have created backlash effects 
that led to greater numbers of crimes’ (Chermak, Freilich and Caspi, 2010: 139). 
As an alternative, participation of extremists (or those they purportedly 
represent) in policymaking is advocated (Dugan and Young, 2010: 164). 
In sum, the majority of our respondents concurred that military action abroad 
has no effect, although details regarding the backlash of such action were not 
captured in the research process.  Similarly, cross-border cooperation between 
police and intelligence agencies was advocated, but the danger of adopting a pre-
crime strategy and targeting individuals and groups on mere suspicion was not 
reckoned with. In other words, no potential unintended consequences of 




This research confirmed, to some extent, that views of organized crime and 
terrorism vary according to the social and professional position one occupies. 
Differences emerged with regard to the causes and the activities of both 
phenomena, but also with respect to the efficacy of preventive and repressive 
responses to them.  
Organized crime 
In the quantitative survey, a high concern was expressed for organized crime 
activities such as drug production and distribution and cybercrime. Participants 
in the qualitative strands of the research concurred, although they tended to 
emphasize the general lack of knowledge and the ineffective flow of information 
characterizing the issue. Drug crime and cybercrime, it was felt, require robust 
responses and strategies in terms of both prevention and repression.  
Very few respondents, mainly participants in the qualitative research groups, 
identified organized criminal networks that had made their way into the licit 
economy/political apparatus. In brief, with few exceptions, they neglected the 
operations conducted by criminal organizations in the legitimate world. 
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Informants involved in this research study made no distinction between 
professional and organized crime and mainly limited their attention to the 
activities carried out by the former in criminal markets.  
Views of the drivers attracting new recruits into the sphere of organized crime 
revolved around family background, in the quantitative as well as the qualitative 
segments of the research. Socio-economic status was deemed to exert a powerful 
influence on the choice to join organized criminal activity. The respondents’ 
views, in other words, echoed learning and subcultural theories, but also 
concepts propounded by the Chicago School of Sociology, such as ‘social 
disorganization’, which is said to allow the flourishing of illicit activities. 
One major commonality between our respondents’ views and existing 
sociological and criminological theories was that involvement in organized crime 
signals a ‘deficit’, namely a lack of socialization, legitimate opportunities, or the 
absence of ‘guardians’, that is effective law and order forces. 
The main dissonance between their views and those found in the criminological 
literature were manifest in the role they attributed to law enforcers and in the 
lack of appreciation of the surrogate social order, governance or trust provided 
by organized crime.  
In response to organized crime, most respondents advocated the enhancement 
of police activities and technical measures, rather than the improvement of the 
social and economic conditions leading to illegal behaviour. In this sense, they 
expressed confidence in the effectiveness of measures that are already 
encouraged or implemented at the European level.  
Terrorism 
The expansion of terrorist networks was strongly imputed to successful 
propaganda and recruitment, with both being identified as priorities for 
investigation and law enforcement. In this respect, a mismatch was noted with 
previous theoretical and empirical work.  
As for the main cause leading to involvement in terrorist activities, this was 
associated with cultures that promote extreme ideological views. A strong 
association with socio-economic conditions was also recorded, counter to 
existing literature which, instead, underplays this aspect. Individual pathology 
was, consequently, largely discounted as one of the etiological sources of 
terrorist recruitment. The greatest danger of terrorism in modern Europe, it was 
felt, comes from Islamic fundamentalist extremists, and their theocratic 
regressive yearnings was said to spring from the perceived injustices they suffer.  
Responses to terrorist activity through the invasion of countries were criticized, 
thus echoing views widely expressed in the extant literature. Respondents 
believed that the best way to weaken terrorist networks was to promote cross-
border police co-operation. In the qualitative strand of the research the need to 
involve Muslim communities in preventative projects was highlighted. 
Two main strategic approaches were identified in respect of responses. 
Governmental ‘technical’ measures, or ‘hard’ military responses, on the one 
hand, and ‘soft’ educational programmes to be conducted in ‘at risk’ 
 17 
communities, on the other. Our respondents stressed the importance of both 
approaches.  
Interestingly, in both areas addressed (organized crime and terrorism) the 
responses advocated proved to be very similar to those already discussed and 
valued in the literature and, in part, to those already implemented across Europe. 
This would prove that the process some informants hoped for, which should 





Abbas, T. and Awan, I. (2015), ‘Limits of UK Counterterrorism Policy and its 
Implications for Islamophobia and Far Right Extremism’, International Journal 
for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 4: 16-29. 
Adonis (2016), Violence and Islam, Cambridge: Polity. 
Ahmed, S. (2015), ‘The Emotionalization of the War on Terror: Counterterrorism, 
Fear, Risk, Insecurity and Helplessness’, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 15: 545-
560. 
Andreano, R. and Siegfried, J. (eds) (1980), The Economics of Crime, New 
York: John Wiley. 
Arlacchi, P. (1994), Addio Cosa Nostra. La vita di Tommaso Buscetta, Milan: 
Rizzoli. 
Armao, F. (2000), Il sistema mafia. Dall’economia-mondo al dominio locale, 
Turin: Bollati Boringhieri. 
Badiou, A. (2016), Our Wound Is not So Recent, Cambridge: Polity. 
Becker, G. (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 76: 169-217. 
 
Becker, G. (1976), The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Brier, V. and Hausken, K. (2011), ‘Endogenizing the Sticks and Carrots: Modeling 
Possible Perverse Effects of Counterterrorism Measures’, Annals of Operations 
Research, 186 (1): 39-59. 
Buc, P. (2015), Holy Wars, Martyrdom and Terror, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Chermac, S.M., Freilich, J.D. and Caspi, D. (2010), ‘Policymakers and Law 
Enforcement Must Consider the Unintended Consequences of Their Proposed 
Responses to Extremist and Terrorist Groups’, in Frost, N.A., Freilich, J.D. and 
Clear, T.R. (eds), Contemporary Issues in Criminal Justice Policy, Belmont: 
Wadsworth. 
Chilcot, J. (2016), The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, London: HMSO. 
 18 
Cloward, R. And Ohlin, L. (1960), Delinquency and Opportunity, New York: The 
Free Press. 
Cohen, A. (1955), Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang, New York: The Free 
Press. 
Dino, A. (2008), La mafia devota, Rome/Bari: Laterza. 
Dino, A. (2016), A colloquio con Gaspare Spatuzza, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Dino, A. and Ruggiero, V. (2012), ‘Il metodo mafioso’, special issue of Studi sulla 
Questione Criminale, VII (1): 1-130. 
Downes, D. and Rock, P. (1988), Understanding Deviance. A Guide to the 
Sociology of Crime and Rule Breaking, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Dugan, L. and Young, J. (2010), ‘Allow Extremist Participation in the Policy-
Making Process’, in Frost, N.A., Freilich, J.D. and Clear, T.R. (eds), Contemporary 
Issues in Criminal Justice Policy, Belmont: Wadsworth. 
Dunn, G. (1996), ‘Major Mafia Gangs in Russia’, Transnational Organized Crime, 2 
(2-3): 63-87). 
 
English, R. (ed) (2016), Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
European Commission (2015), Commission Takes Steps to Strengthen EU 
Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism, Organised Crime and Cybercrime, 
Press Release, Strasbourg 28 April (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
4865_en.htm), accessed  20 January 2018. 
European Parliament (2016), Expectations for EU Action. Fight against 
Terrorism and Radicalisation, Strasbourg : Public Opinion Monitoring Unit. 
 
Europol (2011) EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, The Hague: Europol 
Public Information. 
 
Ferreira, O. R. (2016), ‘Violent Mexico: Participatory and Multipolar Violence 
Associated with Organized Crime’, International Journal of Conflict and 
Violence, 10(1): 41. 
 
Fijnaut, C. (2015), ‘European Union Organized Crime Policies’, in Paoli, L. (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fiss, O. (2016), A War Like No Other: The Constitution in a Time of Terror, New 
York: New Press. 
Gambetta, D. (1992), La mafia siciliana. Un’industria della protezione privata, 
Turin: Einaudi. 
Gerges, F.A. (2015), ISIS. A history, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gill, P. (2016), Today We Drop Bombs, Tomorrow We Build Bridges, London: Zed 
Books. 
 19 
Gottfredson, M. and Hirschi, T. (1990), A General Theory of Crime, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Hamm, M.S. (2007), Terrorism as crime, New York: New York University Press.  
Hamm, M.S. (2013), The Spectacular Few. Prisoner Radicalization and the 
Evolving Terrorist Threat, New York: New York University Press. 
Hassner, R.E. (2016), Religion on the Battlefield, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Hayden, M. (2016), Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of 
Terror, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Hemminbby, C. (2017), ‘Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists’ 
Targeting Preference in Europe’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 11: 25-41. 
Hess, H. (1973), Mafia, Bari: Laterza. 
Hobbs, D. (2013), Lush Life: Constructing Organized Crime in the UK, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hobsbawm, E.J. (1971), Primitive Rebels, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Horkuc, H. (2009), Said Nursi: Makers of Islamic Civilization, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ismael, J. S. and Ismael, S. T. (2013), ‘The Arab Spring and the Uncivil State’, Arab 
Studies Quarterly, 35: 229-240. 
Kennedy, H. (2016), The Caliphate, Harmondsworth: Pelican 
Landesco, J. (1969), Organized crime in Chicago, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Lombroso, C. (1971), L’uomo delinquente, Turin: Bocca. 
Lynch, M. (2015), The New Arab Wars: Uprising and Anarchy in the Middle East, 
New York: Public Affairs. 
Madon, N.S., Murphy, K. and Cherney, A. (2017), ‘Promoting Community 
Collaboration in Counterterrorism: Do Social Identities and Perceptions of 
Legitimacy Mediate Reactions to Procedural Justice Policing?’, British Journal of 
Criminology, 57: 1144-1164. 
McCulloch, J. and Pickering, S. (2009), ‘Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism’, British 
Journal of Criminology, 49: 628-645. 
McDonald, K. (2013), Our Violent World. Terrorism in Society, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
McIntosh, M. (1975), The Organisation of Crime, London: Macmillan.  
Milhaupt, C. J. and West, M. D. (2000), ‘The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An 
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime’, The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 15: 41-98. 
Merton, R. (1968), Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: The Free Press. 
Moghaddam, F.M. (2005), ‘The Staircase to Terrorism. A Psychological 
Exploration’, American Psychologist, 60: 161-169. 
 20 
Mythen, G. and Walklate, S. (2006), ‘Criminology and Terrorism: Which Thesis? 
Risk Society or Governmentality? British Journal of Criminology, 46: 379-398.  
Peterson, M. (1991), 'The Changes of a Decade', Criminal Organizations, 6 (3-4): 
20-2. 
Rakoff, J.S. (2016), ‘Terror and Everybody’s Rights’, New York Review of Books, 
29 September: 80-82. 
Ruggiero, V. (2000), Crime and Markets, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ruggiero, V. (2017), Dirty Money. On Financial Delinquency, Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
Sacks, J. (2015), Not in God’s Name. Confronting Religious Violence, London: 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
Sageman,  M. (2017), Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia, University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Santos, F. and Machado, H. (2016), ‘Fighting Cross-Border Crime and Terrorism 
in the EU’, paper presented at the European Society of Criminology Conference, 
Munster University, 21-14 September. 
Sen, A. (2015), The Country of First Boys and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shaw, C. (1930), The Jack-Roller: A Delinquent Boy's Own Story, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Small, T. (2016), ‘Wars of Religion’, Times Literary Supplement, 23 September, 
Middle East Special Feature: 1-12. 
Smith, B.K. et al (2016), ‘Framing Daesh: Failures and Consequences’, 
Perspectives on Terrorism, 10: 42-52. 
Thrasher, F. (1927), The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Todorov, T. (2014), The Inner Enemies of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity.  
Toscano, R. (2016), ‘Il tempo della paura’, Micro Mega, 2: 119-128. 
Varese, F. (ed) (2010), Organized Crime: Critical Concepts in Criminology. 
London: Routledge. 
Varese, F. (2017), Mafia Life, London: Profile. 
Victoroff, J. and Kruglanski, A.W. (eds) (2009), Psychology of Terrorism: Classic 
and Contemporary Insights, London: Psychology Press. 
Walklate, S. and Mythen, G. (2016), ‘Fractured Lives, Splintered Knowledge: 
Making Criminological Sense of the January, 2015 Terrorist Attack in Paris’, 
Critical Criminology, 24: 333-346. 
Weatcroft, G. (2016), ‘Tony Blair’s Eternal Shame: The Report’, New York Review 
of Books, 13 October: 42-44. 
Whyte, F.W. (1943), Street Comer Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 21 
Wills, G. (2016), ‘My Koran problem’, New York review of Books,  26 September: 
16-19. 
Witte, R. (1996), Racist Violence and the State, London: Longman. 
Wolfendale, J. (2007), ‘Terrorism, Security and the Threat of Counter-Terrorism’, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30: 75-92. 
Zedner, L. (2000), ‘The Pursuit of Security’, in Hope, T. and Sparks, R. (eds), 
Crime, Risk and Insecurity, London and Neew York: Routledge. 
 
Funding has been received from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement N. 700688. 
 
